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Abstract
This article constructs a job-search model in which worker's ability varies over time; a high-
ability unemployed might lose her skills due to prolonged unemployment whereas a low-ability
employed might acquire her skills due to (an implicit) on-the-job training. We numerically
show that both pecuniary reward for short-term unemployed and reduction in unemployment
bene¯ts leads to lower unemployment rate, however, the former policy does stimulate career-
enhancing of long-term unemployed whereas the latter does not. In addition, numerical
analysis suggests that mixture of the two policy can lead to higher aggregate welfare than
under a sole policy.
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1 Introduction
This paper constructs a general equilibrium job-search model in which individual's their skills vary
over time; high-skilled jobless workers lose skills due to prolonged unemployment whereas low-
skilled employed workers acquire their skills due to (an implicit) on-the-job training. The aim of
this article is, by making use of the model, to consider a policy that would overcome the serious
issues below.
OECD (2002) documents that on average 30% of unemployed workers are long-term unemployed
who has been unemployed for one year or more in 2000, and in ten countries of them, the proportions
are over 40%. These proportions are historical high, and OECD (2002) concludes that \the long-
term unemployed appear to be relatively more likely to go on to become very-long-term unemployed
in some countries, and more likely to leave the labor force in others". As frequently discussed, the
prolonged unemployment duration makes workers discouraged and/or less skilled, which makes
again reemployment of the workers more di±cult. Notably, such a negative spiral aggravate social
welfare, in the sense of both that high unemployment rate worsens social welfare and that prolonged
unemployment deteriorates welfare for long-term jobless workers. So it is worthwhile to consider a
policy that overcomes the serious issues.
Heterogeneity in skills among individuals is treated in some earlier studies. For instance, Pis-
sarides (1992) analyzes a worker's loss of skills in an overlapping generations framework. In his
model, an old who was employed when young has higher productivity than an old who was un-
employed when young. Thus individual's skill is changed for once in her life and the skill is not
accumulated at all. As another example, Albrecht and Vroman (2002) studies a job-search model
in which distribution of worker's skill is two-point (high or low). Since their paper focuses on ¯rm's
behavior, skill of each individual is assumed to be constant over time.
In contrast to these studies, this article assumes that individual's skill level varies over time.
Following Albrecht and Vroman (2002), we assume that distribution of skills is of two-point (either
high or low). Under the assumption, high-skilled unemployed loses her skills if she cannot ¯nd a
job within certain duration while a low-skilled unemployed acquires her skills if she works at a job
for certain duration. The rationale behind the assumption is that the former is due to prolonged
unemployment while the latter is due to (an implicit) on-the-job training. Given the circumstance,
we consider e®ects of two labor policies which are stated below on unemployment rate and on
social welfare.
The policies considered here are quite simple. One is reduction in unemployment bene¯t and
2
the other is reemployment bonus. The former is straightforward. High unemployment bene¯ts
lead to high value of being unemployed, which results in high unemployment rate. Thus cutback
in the bene¯ts would decrease unemployment rate. The latter is originally planned as an economic
experiment (for summary, see Meyer, 1995), which is a reward for workers who are hired within
certain duration after ¯red. It directly increases worker's incentive to be employed, which results
in lower unemployment rate. In summary, the former is a stick while the latter is a carrot as
employment-boosting policy.
Theoretically, it is obvious that the two policies have similar e®ects on unemployment rate but
not on social welfare, since the stick policy decreases welfare for jobless workers while the carrot
one bene¯ts for reward-quali¯ed workers. This paper, however, focuses on another e®ect of the
carrot policy on a worker's behavior. In this paper we do not treat on-the-job search, so if a worker
wants to change her job, she must separate from the current job and once become unemployed
to seek a new better job. In that context, reduction in unemployment bene¯ts would make her
discouraged to enhance her career since the value of unemployment is decreased.
Recalling that workers are either unemployed or employed and either high-skilled or low-skilled
in our setting, a policy that reduces only the rate of unemployment would be insu±cient from the
point of view of social welfare. This is because the most socially desirable situation in the economy
is to increase the number of high-skilled employed. So the policy really needed is such that not
only the rate of unemployment is fallen o® but low-skilled workers pursue a more productive job.
In that context, reduction in unemployment bene¯ts would make a worker discouraged to enhance
her career since the value of unemployment is decreased, so a worker who is hired by low-skilled
job does not intend to enhance her career. The pecuniary reward, however, can give a worker
who is employed by low-skilled job an incentive to enhance her career. In summary, reduction in
unemployment bene¯ts does operate as an employment-boosting policy but does not as career-
enhancing policy while implement of pecuniary bonus program operate as both policies. Notably,
since the career-enhancement increases the number of individuals who are employed at a more
productive job it has a positive e®ect on social welfare.
Given above, this paper shows examples of policy e®ects on unemployment rate and on social
welfare. As predicted above, we numerically show that, if the tax that ¯nances unemployment
bene¯ts and/or pecuniary bonus is not too high, (i) both lower unemployment bene¯ts and higher
pecuniary rewards lead to lower unemployment rate, (ii) both higher unemployment bene¯ts and
higher pecuniary bonus result in higher welfare, and (iii) if the two policies are implemented simul-
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taneously, moderate level of unemployment compensation and reemployment bonus can achieve
higher social welfare than when one of the two policies solely implemented.
The rest of the paper is composed as follows. Section 2 describes the model and de¯nes the
equilibrium, section 3 is devoted to numerical analysis, and section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Assumptions
Workers
This paper considers a continuous-time job-search model in which workers are in¯nitely-lived and
risk-neutral. We focus only on a steady-state equilibrium. A measure of workers is ¯xed and
normalized to one. Workers are either employed or unemployed and either high-skilled or low-
skilled. Let u be a rate of unemployment. All jobless workers receive unemployment bene¯t z.
Following Albrecht and Vroman (2002), our model assumes that a distribution of skills among
individuals is a two-point distribution; a fraction ° of the unemployed workers are high-skilled, a
fraction 1 ¡ ° of them are low-skilled, a fraction Á of employed workers are high-skilled, and a
fraction 1¡ Á of them are low-skilled. Note that, unlike Albrecht and Vroman (2002), we assume
that workers' skills level vary over time so that ° and Á are endogenously determined in equilibrium
as described in detail below.
This paper assumes that a high-skilled unemployed worker becomes low-skilled unemployed at
a Poisson rate ¸, which implies that a high-skilled unemployed worker might lose skills if she does
not work for certain duration (on average 1=¸). 1 The paper also presumes that a low-skilled
employed acquires skills at a Poisson rate ¹. For simplicity, the paper does not treat on-the-job
search. Thus, a low-skilled employed who acquired skills must become a high-skilled unemployed
once to improve her career. 2 Suppose that high-skilled unemployed workers (whose unemployment
1Regarding the assumption, it would be appropriate to assume a time-varying unemployment bene¯t rather than
a constant unemployment bene¯t, however, such an assumption requires a more complicate setup. See footnote 2.
2Note that high-skilled unemployed workers are necessarily short-term unemployed worker but low-skilled un-
employed workers are not necessarily long-term unemployed worker in the model. This is because low-skilled
unemployed workers include a worker who has just lost her job (that is, they are short-term unemployed).
Given the fact, if we assume a time-varying unemployment bene¯ts, the model needs three states of unem-
ployment; high-skilled short-term unemployment, low-skilled short-term unemployment, and low-skilled long-term
unemployment. To avoid the complexity, the paper regards all low-skilled unemployed as substantively long-term
unemployed even if they are short-term unemployed. Hence, throughout the paper, the words high-(low -)skilled are
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duration is necessarily short as in described in footnote 2) can receive reemployment bonus B if
they are hired.
Firms
Jobs are either ¯lled or vacant. For simplicity, unlike Albrecht and Vroman (2002), assume that
there are ¯rms which hire only high-skilled worker and only low-skilled worker. The former is
called type h ¯rm and the latter type l ¯rm. Thus there exists practically two labor markets in
the model. For convenience they are called type h market and type l market, respectively.
When a job is ¯lled, the job produces output yi and payes wage wi in the type i(= h; l) ¯rm.
Assume that yh > yl. The wage is determined by bilateral Nash bargaining as described below.
Filled jobs break up at an exogenous Poisson rate ±. If a job is vacant, the type i ¯rm incurs cost
ci and the cost is assumed ch > cl. The markets are assumed to be free entry/exit so that ¯rms
enter or exit the market so as to maximize their pro¯ts, as described below.
Government
The role of government in this model is to collect tax to ¯nance unemployment bene¯t z and
reemployment bonus B. The tax rate is endogenously determined to hold balanced ¯nance at any
moment. The details are in subsection 2.4.
Matching Technology
Workers seeking a job and ¯rms recruiting a worker meet randomly through a matching process.
The matching technology in each market are speci¯ed as follows:
M(°u; vh) = (°uvh)
1
2 ;
M((1¡ °)u; vl) = [(1¡ °)uvl] 12 ;
where vi(i = h; l) denotes a measure of vacancies. Given the matching technology, rates of matching
for workers in each market are given by (°uvh)
1
2=°u = µ
1
2
h and [(1¡ °)uvl]
1
2=(1¡ °)u = µ
1
2
l , where
µh ´ vh=°u and µl ´ vl=(1 ¡ °)u are known as labor market tightness. Similarly, matching rates
for ¯rms in each market are given by (°uvh)
1
2=vh = µ
¡ 1
2
h and [(1¡ °)uvl]
1
2=vl = µ
¡ 1
2
l , respectively.
used rather than short-(long-)term.
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2.2 Asset Value Equations
Before describe asset value equations, recall the assumption that a low-skilled employed acquires
skills at a Poisson rate ¹. Then, does the worker immediately separate from the current job? In
other words, does the worker necessarily become a high-skilled unemployed worker to improve her
career? The answer is no. If the worker behaves rationally, she would consider whether such a
career-enhancing separation is bene¯cial or not. If so, the worker separates from the current job
to improve her career as soon as she has acquired skills. If not, she still works at the current job
until an exogenous job destruction occurs even if she has acquired skills.
Given the fact, we should consider both economy with and without career-enhancing separation
(hereafter, abbr. CES). Note that CES arises or not is endogenously determined because value of
each state is endogenously determined. To do the analysis, the paper proceeds in two steps, guess
and verify: the following subsections in this section describe CES economy supposing that CES
condition holds (the guess), and the next section examines whether the condition meet or not by
using numerical calculus (the verify). The economy with no-CES is summarized in Appendix A.1.
Asset Value Equations for Workers
We use the following notations: Uh (Ul) is the present-discounted value of high- (low-) skilled
unemployment, Wh is the value of high-skilled employment and W
h
l (W
l
l ) is the value of being
employed at type l ¯rm where a worker has acquired skills (where a worker is still low-skilled),
respectively. Assume that all individuals are levied capitation tax ¿ which is used to ¯nance
unemployment bene¯t z and bonus B. Suppose also that all jobless workers receive unemployment
bene¯t z regardless of their skills. Recall that a high-skilled unemployed loses skills at the rate ¸
whereas a low-skilled employed acquires at the rate ¹ and that all jobs face to an exogenous job
destruction at the rate ±. Letting r be a discount factor which is common to all individuals, the
value functions are given by the following equations:
rUh = z ¡ ¿ + µ
1
2
h (Wh +B ¡ Uh) + ¸(Ul ¡ Uh); (1)
rUl = z ¡ ¿ + µ
1
2
l (Wl ¡ Ul); (2)
rWh = wh ¡ ¿ + ±(Uh ¡Wh); (3)
rW hl = wl ¡ ¿ + ±(Uh ¡W hl ); (4)
rW ll = wl ¡ ¿ + ±(Ul ¡W ll ) + ¹ maxfUh ¡W ll ;W hl ¡W ll g: (5)
Note that the fourth term in (5) represents a low-skilled employed worker's decision whether the
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worker separates from the current job if she acquired skills (Uh ¡W ll ) or the worker still works at
the current job even if she acquired skills (W hl ¡W ll ). The former corresponds to CES whereas the
latter no-CES. Using these notations, CES condition is given by Uh ¸W hl . 3
Asset Value Equations for Firms
Firms discount the future at the rate r as well as workers. Let Vi(i = h; l) denotes a present-
discounted value of vacancy for type i ¯rms and let Ji(i = h; l) stands for a present-discounted
value of ¯lled job for type i ¯rms. The values of vacancy and ¯lled job are recursively represented
as follows:
rVh = ¡ch + µ¡
1
2
h (Jh ¡ Vh); (6)
rVl = ¡cl + µ¡
1
2
l (Jl ¡ Vl); (7)
rJh = yh ¡ wh + ±(Vh ¡ Jh); (8)
rJl = yl ¡ wl + (± + ¹)(Vl ¡ Jl): (9)
Eq. (9) shows that type l ¯rms face to an exogenous job destruction at the rate ±+ ¹ because the
worker-¯rm match breaks up not only when a shock occurs at the rate ± but when the employee
acquires skills at the rate ¹. Supposing that the labor market is free entry, ¯rms post a vacancy
until the expected value of job o®er equals to zero, which implies that Vh = Vl = 0 holds in
equilibrium (the free entry/exit condition).
2.3 Equilibrium
In this subsection we characterize the equilibrium in CES economy. We begin with description of
°ow conditions which determines distribution of workers.
Flow Conditions
In the steady state, population in each state does not vary over time so that an in°ow and out°ow
in each state must be equal. Recall that u represents the rate of unemployment, ° denotes the
ratio of high-skilled in unemployed workers and Á indicates the ratio of high-skilled in employed
workers in CES economy.
3More precisely, CES condition should be stated as Uh ¸W ll since the expressionWhl is not needed in CES econ-
omy, however, to emphasize the fact that CES condition implies that the state value of high-skilled unemployment
is higher than (or equal to) the state value of low-skilled employment after skill acquisition, we use Whl .
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First, consider the °ow condition on high-skilled unemployment state. The in°ow consists of
workers from high-skilled employment due to an exogenous job destruction, Á(1¡u)±, plus workers
from low-skilled employment due to the workers' career-enhancing separation, (1¡Á)(1¡u)¹, while
the out°ow consists of workers to low-skilled unemployment due to prolonged unemployment, °u¸,
plus high-skilled employed who ¯nd a job, °uµ
1
2
h . The °ow condition on high-skilled unemployment
is thus Á(1 ¡ u)± + (1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ u)¹ = °uµ
1
2
h + °u¸. Similarly, the condition on low-skilled unem-
ployment is given by °u¸ + (1 ¡ u)(1 ¡ Á)± = (1 ¡ °)uµ
1
2
l , which states that the in°ow (workers
from high-skilled unemployment due to prolonged unemployment plus workers from low-skilled em-
ployment due to an exogenous job destruction) equals to the out°ow (workers who are employed).
Finally, the condition on high-skilled employment state is °uµ
1
2
h = Á(1¡ u)±, which indicates that
the in°ow which is high-skilled workers who are employed equals to the out°ow which is composed
by high-skilled workers who lose a job due to a job destruction shock.
By using the three conditions, we obtain the rate of unemployment u, the ratio of high-skilled
in unemployed workers °, and the fraction of high-skilled in employed workers Á in steady state,
which are arranged as follows:
u =
±(¸± + ¸¹+ ¹µ
1
2
l )
µ
1
2
l (¸± + ¹µ
1
2
h ) + ±(¸± + ¸¹+ ¹µ
1
2
l )
; (10)
° =
¹µ
1
2
l
¸± + ¸¹+ ¹µ
1
2
l
; (11)
Á =
¹µ
1
2
h
¸± + ¹µ
1
2
h
: (12)
Wage Determination
When a match is formed, the wage wi(i = h; l) is determined so as to maximize a matching surplus:
wh = arg max(Wh+B¡Uh)¯(Jh¡Vh)1¡¯ and wl = arg max(W ll ¡Ul)¯(Jl¡Vl)1¡¯, where ¯ denotes
a bargaining power for workers. The sharing rules are given by (1¡¯)(Wh+B¡Uh) = ¯(Jh¡Vh)
and (1¡ ¯)(Wl¡Ul) = ¯(Jl¡Vl). Using these conditions, state values (1)-(9), and free entry/exit
conditions Vh = Vl = 0, we obtain the following expressions:
wh = ¯yh + (1¡ ¯)z ¡ (1¡ ¯)(r + ±)B + ¯(rchµh + ¸clµl)
r + ¸
; (13)
wl = ¯yl + (1¡ ¯)z + ¯[(r + ¸+ ¹)clµl ¡ ¹chµh]
r + ¸
: (14)
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Eq.(13) shows that wh is increasing in both µh and µl. Since higher µh implies larger vacancies
relative to high-skilled jobless workers, it is di±cult for ¯rms to recruit a worker, which makes
workers more advantageous, which leads to higher wage. In addition, since higher µl implies larger
employment opportunity in type l labor market, high-skilled jobless workers do not care whether
the bargaining is approved or not, which also makes workers ascendant. In contrast, as (14) shows,
wl is increasing in µl but decreasing in µh. Since higher µh indicates that it is easy to ¯nd a job
in type h market, which makes the state value of high-skilled unemployment higher. Low-skilled
jobless workers want to move the state, however, since they have to be employed once in type l
¯rm, they would accept lower wage. Hence higher µl leads to lower wl. Note that, from (13), wh is
decreasing in bonus level B. This implies that since higher B makes workers more hunger to get
the bonus, they are willing to accept much lower wage.
Job Creation
As noted above, ¯rms open vacancy until the expected pro¯t equals to zero in the steady state.
The fact is represented by the free entry/exit conditions, Vh = Vl = 0. Using them and eliminating
Jh and Jl from (6)-(9), we have the following expressions:
µh = [(yh ¡ wh)=ch(r + ±)]2; (15)
µl = [(yl ¡ wl)=cl(r + ± + ¹)]2: (16)
By making use of (13)-(16), we can obtain the equilibrium values of wh; wl; µh, and µl.
Government Budget
As described in Section 2.1, the expenditure for unemployment bene¯ts z and reemployment bonus
B is ¯nanced by capitation tax and the tax is determined so as to balance the government budget
at any moment. The tax is determined by the following budget constraint:
¿ = uz + °uµ
1
2
hB; (17)
where the ¯rst term of the right hand side indicates the expenditure for unemployment bene¯t z
and the second term represents the expenditure for reemployment bonus B.
Characterization of Equilibrium
Up to this point, we have obtained all expressions that characterize the equilibrium in our model.
The equilibrium consists of 8-tuple, fu; °; Á; µh; µl; wh; wl; ¿g. They are successively derived as
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follows. First, the wage wi and tightness of each market µi (i = h; l) is determined by wage
bargaining and ¯rm's optimal entry strategy (13)-(16). Second, the rate of unemployment u,
the fractions of high-skilled in jobless workers ° and in employed workers Á are derived by °ow
conditions (10)-(12). Finally, the capitation tax ¿ is determined so as to satisfy the government
budget (17). We can con¯rm that the equilibrium is uniquely determined, which is shown in
Appendix A.2.
3 Numerical Analysis
In the previous section we describe an economy with career-enhancing separation by assuming that
such a behavior arises: i.e., the CES condition Uh ¸ W hl is assumed to hold. However, the guess
may not be true since the state values in the condition are endogenously determined in a general
equilibrium. In other words, the equilibrium stated in the previous section is just a candidate, but
not a certi¯able equilibrium. Hence, before the analysis, we must rule out candidates of equilibrium
if the CES condition does not hold. We examine whether the CES condition holds or not with
varying policy variable, unemployment bene¯ts z, pecuniary rewards B or both since we focus on
the policies.
Before the examination, we can con¯rm that two employment policies, one is increase in pecu-
niary bonus B and the other is decrease in unemployment bene¯ts z, have a di®erent e®ect on the
decision about career-enhancing separation. Regarding the CES condition, Uh ¸ W hl , the former
policy directly increases the left-hand side whereas the latter one directly decreases the left-hand
side (of course, both B and z indirectly a®ect the state values). This suggests that the both
policies can operate as employment-boosting program, however, the policy that cuts unemploy-
ment bene¯ts is less apt to be career-enhancing policy. Since career-enhancing separation increases
the number of employed in high-skilled job (which is the most valuable state in our economy),
consequently, pecuniary reward policy seems to be more desirable from a point of view of social
welfare.
Social Welfare Function and Parameters
As preparation for our analysis, de¯ne the measure of social welfare and set parameter values.
Following Cahuc and Lehmann (2000), we use an expected utility for each type of individual as
a measure of welfare (for example, the measure of welfare for a high-skilled unemployed is rUh).
In line with this manner, we de¯ne a measure of aggregate welfare by the weighted sum of all
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individual's welfare:
­ = rf(1¡ u)[ÁWh + (1¡ Á)W ll ] + u[°Uh + (1¡ °)Ul]g: (18)
It is di±cult to obtain some of parameter values we need, in particular, we do not have decisive
evidence on the rate of loss and acquirement of individual's ability, ¸ and ¹. In consideration of
plausibility, we set ¸ = 1:0 and ¹ = 0:4. This implies that the average duration of being high-
skilled when unemployed is 12 months (12£ (1=1:0) = 12:0) and that the average duration of being
low-skilled when she works at type l ¯rm is 30 months (12£ (1=4:0) = 30:0). 4 In other words, a
high-skilled worker loses her skills if she cannot ¯nd a job within one year on average after ¯red,
and a low-skilled worker acquires her skills if she works at a certain job for two and a half years
on average. Regarding the rest of parameter values, we set yh = 5:0, yl = 3:0, ¯ = 0:5, r = 0:05,
ch = 1:0, cl = 0:5, ± = 0:2, z 2 [0; 3:5], and B 2 [0; 10]. 5
In the rest of the paper, we focus on the economy with CES and show results under (i) pecuniary
reward policy where B is policy variable given z, (ii) reduction in unemployment bene¯t where z
is policy variable given B, and (iii) a mixture of the two policies where both B and z are policy
variables in order.
Pecuniary Reward
Here we examine e®ects of reemployment bonus program on the unemployment rate and on social
welfare. To focus on this policy and since the level of unemployment bene¯t is taken as given
here, we assume that z = 3:5. This implies the policy that reduces unemployment bene¯t is not
implemented at all.
Numerical results are placed in Figure 1. (1-i) represents social welfare de¯ned in (18) with
varying bonus levels. It has hump-shaped, which implies that welfare improves as bonus increases
and after that worsens. This is because higher reward bene¯ts for bonus-quali¯ed workers, however,
it heavily burdens as the tax that ¯nances increases. (1-ii) and (1-iii) represents unemployment
rate for high- and low-skilled, respectively. These are monotonically decreasing in bonus level as
predicted. Comparing (1-ii) to (1-iii), one can see that the number of low-skilled jobless workers
are more decreased that high-skilled. This causes through two channels. First, since higher bonus
4These calculations are followed from Albrecht and Vroman (2002).
5Note that since the elasticity of the matching technology with respect to vacancy is 0.5, ¯ = 0:5 implies that
we focus on an e±cient economy in the sense that Hosios condition holds (see Hosios, 1990).
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makes bonus-quali¯ed workers more apt to get a job, in°ow to low-skilled unemployment (i.e.,
prolonged unemployment) reduces. Second, since low-skilled jobless workers are also induced to
get a job as discussed before, the out°ow from low-skilled unemployment increases and part of
them move to high-skilled unemployment state due to career-enhancing separation, which results
in increase in high-skilled unemployed. Consequently, these two e®ects extremely decrease the
number of low-skilled unemployed and moderately decrease the number of high-skilled unemployed.
This result would suggest that, if tax burden is not too heavy, pecuniary bonus program seems to
quite a policy as employment-boosting and career-enhancing.
2 4 6 8 10 B
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3.05
3.1
3.15
H1-iL social welfare
2 4 6 8 10 B
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0.054
0.056
0.058
0.06
H1-iiL unemployment rate of high-skilled
2 4 6 8 10 B
0.075
0.125
0.15
0.175
0.2
H1-iiiL unemployment rate of low-skilled
Figure 1: reemployment bonus (z = 3:5)
Reduction in Unemployment Bene¯t
We examine e®ects of reduction in unemployment bene¯t on social welfare and on unemployment
rate for high- and low-skilled here. To focus on this policy, we assume that there is no bonus
program (B = 0). Results are summarized in Figure 2, which are quite similar to the case of
reemployment bonus. Social welfare (2-i) has hump-shaped, which suggests that moderate level of
unemployment bene¯t maximizes social welfare. If the level is too high, heavy tax burden worsens
individual's welfare while if the level is too low, it directly reduces individual's welfare. (2-ii) and
(2-iii) show unemployment rate for high- and low-skilled unemployed, respectively. As discussed
above, lower bene¯t leads to lower unemployment rate because jobless workers are more apt to
get a job to escape from the current state. 6 Note that generous bene¯t decreases the number
of high-skilled unemployed, which results in drastic increase in low-skilled unemployed as (2-iii)
indicates.
6In a model with search e®orts of workers, it can be easily con¯rmed that lower unemployment bene¯ts leads to
higher job-search e®orts, which results in lower unemployment rate.
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Figure 2: reduction in unemployment bene¯ts (B = 0)
Mixture of the Two Policies
Finally we analyze e®ects of mixture of the two policies on social welfare and on unemployment
rate. To capture the shape of plane by numerical calculation, levels of pecuniary reward and
unemployment bene¯t are divided into 10 grids, which are shown in Figure 3. (3-i) shows welfare
level under arbitrary pairs of bonus B and unemployment bene¯t z.
When z is low, welfare is monotonically decreasing in bonus level. Such a counterintuitive
situation occurs because bonus-quali¯ed workers (high-skilled) can gain the bonus if they are hired
whereas no-bonus-quali¯ed workers (low-skilled) are heavily imputed the tax burden though they
do not gain bene¯ts from pecuniary reward. In aggregate, reduction in welfare of low-skilled workers
dominates increase in welfare of high-skilled workers, which results in worsening of social welfare.
When z is high, however, welfare is hump-shaped with respect to bonus level. Consider an extreme
case, z = 3:5. Under such a generous unemployment compensation, there are many unemployed
workers. Given the situation, an increase in pecuniary reward has two opposite e®ects on tax
rate. First, it straightforwardly increases the tax rate, which worsens welfare. Second, since there
are a lot of jobless workers with generous unemployment compensation, reduction in the number
of jobless workers by bonus program drastically decreases the tax burden due to unemployment
compensation, which improves welfare (even if the level of pecuniary reward is decent). When the
bonus level is not too high, the second e®ect dominates the ¯rst one, which improves aggregate
welfare, and vice versa.
Note that, by comparing (3-i) with (1-i) and (2-i), the maximized level of welfare under mixture
of the two policies is higher than welfare level under a sole policy. The reason is straightforward.
Since the tax burden due to unemployment bene¯t is reduced if the number of unemployed de-
creases, the two positive e®ect on social welfare. Reduction in jobless worker's welfare due to
curtailed unemployment bene¯t is dominated by the positive e®ect, so aggregate welfare improves.
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(3-ii) and (3-iii) show the unemployment rate of high- and low-skilled, respectively. Both rates
are nearly increasing in unemployment bene¯t and decreasing in pecuniary reward. From (3-ii),
high unemployment bene¯t and low bonus lead to reduction in the number of high-skilled unem-
ployed, because it drastically increases the number of low-skilled jobless workers as (3-iii) indicates.
Note that, by comparing (3-iii) with (1-iii) and (2-iii), the number of low-skilled unemployed under
mixture of the policies is greatly lower than under a single policy, which suggests the usefulness of
mixture of the two policies.
H3-iL social welfare
2
4
6
8
10
z 2
4
6
8
10
B
2.8
2.9
3
3.1
3.2
H3-iiL unemployment rate of high-skilled
2
4
6
8
10
z 2
4
6
8
10
B
0.045
0.05
0.055
0.06
H3-iiiL unemployment rate of low-skilled
2
4
6
8
10
z 2
4
6
8
10
B
0.05
0.075
0.1
0.125
Figure 3: mixture of the two policies
4 Conclusion
This paper constructs a job-search model in which individual's skills vary over time and examines
e®ects of employment-boosting policy on unemployment rate and on social welfare. We show that,
(i) lower unemployment bene¯t and/or higher pecuniary bonus result in lower unemployment rate,
(ii) higher unemployment bene¯t and/or higher reward lead to higher social welfare, and (iii)
implement of the two policies can achieve higher social welfare than implement of single policy,
if the tax ¯nances these transfers is not too high. These are because pecuniary bonus program
induces workers to seek a more productive job which is socially bene¯cial . In summary, reduction
in unemployment bene¯t decreases unemployment rate at the cost of individual's welfare, however,
pecuniary bonus operates as both employment-boosting policy and career-enhancing policy, which
results in much higher social welfare.
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Appendix
A:1 : No-CES Economy
Here we describe the economy with no career-enhancing separation (no-CES). To distinguish the
endogenous variables in this economy from CES economy, we denote the variables with tilde in
no-CES economy. Matching technologies are given by M(~°; ~u) = (~°~u~vh)
1
2 and M((1 ¡ ~°); ~u) =
[(1¡ ~°)~u~vl] 12 . So the rate of matching for type i (i = h; l) workers (¯rms) is ~µ
1
2
i (
~µ
¡ 1
2
i ).
Asset value equations for workers and for ¯rms are represented as follows:
r ~Uh = z ¡ ~¿ + ~µ
1
2
h (
~Wh +B ¡ ~Uh) + ¸( ~Ul ¡ ~Uh); (10)
r ~Ul = z ¡ ~¿ + ~µ
1
2
l (
~W ll ¡ ~Ul); (20)
r ~Wh = ~wh ¡ ~¿ + ±( ~Uh ¡ ~Wh); (30)
r ~W hl = ~wl ¡ ~¿ + ±( ~Uh ¡ ~W hl ); (40)
r ~W ll = ~wl ¡ ~¿ + ±( ~Ul ¡ ~W ll ) + ¹( ~W hl ¡ ~W ll ); (50)
r ~Vh = ¡c+ ~µ¡
1
2
h (
~Jh ¡ ~Vh); (60)
r ~Vl = ¡c+ ~µ¡
1
2
l (
~Jl ¡ ~Vl); (70)
r ~Jh = yh ¡ ~wh + ±( ~Vh ¡ ~Jh); (80)
r ~Jl = yl ¡ ~wl + ±( ~Vl ¡ ~Jl): (90)
Flow conditions are given by:
~u =
±(¸± + ¸¹+ ¹µ
1
2
l )
~µ
1
2
l (¸± + ¸¹+ ¹
~µ
1
2
h ) + ±(¸± + ¸¹+ ¹
~µ
1
2
l )
; (100)
~° =
¹~µ
1
2
l
¸± + ¸¹+ ¹~µ
1
2
l
; (110)
~Á =
¹~µ
1
2
h
¸± + ¸¹+ ¹~µ
1
2
h
: (120)
Wage equations and job-creation conditions that determine equilibrium wage and market tightness
are derived as follows:
~wh = ¯yh + (1¡ ¯)z ¡ (1¡ ¯)(r + ±)B + ¯(rch
~µh + ¸cl~µl)
r + ¸
; (130)
~wl = ¯yl + (1¡ ¯)z + ¯f[(r + ¸)(± + ¹) + ±¹]cl
~µl ¡ ±¹ch~µhg
(r + ¸)(± + ¹)
; (140)
~µh = [(yh ¡ ~wh)=ch(r + ±)]2; (150)
~µl = [(yl ¡ ~wl)=cl(r + ±)]2: (160)
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The capitation tax is determined so as to balance the following government budget:
~¿ = ~uz + ~°~u~µhB: (17
0)
Welfare function in no-CES economy is given by:
~­ = rf(1¡ u)[ÁWh + (1¡Á)±±+¹ W ll + (1¡Á)¹±+¹ W hl ] + u[°Uh + (1¡ °)Ul]g: (180)
A:2 : Uniqueness of Equilibrium
As stated in section 2.3, the endogenous variables which construct the equilibrium are successively
determined. Recall that wage wi and market tightness µi (i = h; l) are ¯rstly determined by
(13)-(16). Eliminating wh and wl, we have the following expressions:
(r + ±)(r + ¸)chµ
1
2
h + ¯(rchµh + ¸clµl)¡ (1¡ ¯)(r + ¸)[yh ¡ z + (r + ±)B] = 0; (A.1)
(r + ± + ¹)(r + ¸)clµ
1
2
l + ¯[(r + ¸+ ¹)clµl ¡ ¹chµh]¡ (1¡ ¯)(r + ¸)(yl ¡ z) = 0; (A.2)
which are simultaneous equations with respect to µh and µl. By implicit function theorem, we can
easily obtain the shape of these expressions:
@µh
@µl
= ¡ ¯¸cl
1
2
(r + ±)(r + ¸)chµ
¡ 1
2
h + ¯rch
< 0; (A.10)
@µh
@µl
=
1
2
(r + ¸)(r + ± + ¹)clµ
¡ 1
2
l + ¯cl(r + ¸+ ¹)
¯¹ch
> 0: (A.20)
Thus in µl-µh plane, (A.1) is monotonically decreasing while (A.2) is monotonically increasing,
which guarantees uniqueness of the solution. Given the values of µh and µl, wages are determined
by (15) wh = yh ¡ (r + ±)chµ
1
2
h and by (16) wl = yl ¡ (r + ± + ¹)clµ
1
2
l , which is obvious that these
values are also uniquely determined. Since the rest of endogenous variables are evidently unique,
uniqueness of the equilibrium is proved.
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